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INTRODUCTION
In 2001, ten trademark cases provided the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit with the opportunity to delve into a wide
variety of substantive and procedural trademark jurisprudence. The
substantive cases could be considered ho-hum, with the court
affirming the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (the Board) in five
of the six cases reviewed. On the procedural front, however, the court
aggressively confronted both the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
and a district court judge for procedural errors and omissions, thus
fulfilling its mission as a unifier in intellectual property matters.
In reversing or vacating all but one of the four cases decided on
procedural grounds, the Federal Circuit was both active and strict in
its review of three Board decisions and one district court decision. In
one case, the court informed the Board that it had misunderstood
the requirements for the doctrine of laches-confusing it with
equitable estoppel.2  In another, the court criticized the Board's
decision for failing to take into account an intervening statute that
proved dispositive to the case.3 Finally, in an unusual foray into the
issue of the timing of a summary judgment decision, the Federal
Circuit vacated a district court's premature grant of summary
1. The Federal Circuit has jurisdiction to review appeals from the Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board (the Board) pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1070, 1071 (a) (2000).
But see infra note 58 (discussing an alternative form of review for parties dissatisfied
with decisions of the Board).
2. See Bridgestone/Firestone Research, Inc. v. Auto. Club de l'Ouest de la
France, 245 F.3d 1359, 1363, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1460, 1463 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(noting that the requirement of "'specific evidence of 'reliance'" could be proof of
estoppel, but does not relate to laches).
3. See United States Olympic Comm. v. Toy Truck Lines, Inc., 237 F.3d 1331,
1334, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1380, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (admonishing the Board for
ignoring the applicable law, and finding that "[t]he USOC's opposition to Toy
Truck's application for registration could not be denied without consideration of the
1998 act.").
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judgment and directed it to allow additional time for discovery.4
Through these decisions, the Federal Circuit sent a clear message
that the Board and the lower courts would be well advised to address
procedural issues carefully if they expect their decisions to withstand
review.
In contrast to the court's procedural decisions in 2001, the court's
review of substantive issues was relatively conservative, primarily
sticking to established doctrines while examining the details of each
case carefully and methodically. While none of the 2001 cases seemed
particularly groundbreaking, the Federal Circuit continued to refine
its ever-increasing body of substantive law. The court explained and
expanded upon several important legal doctrines, including the
"related goods" doctrine5 and the proper method of analysis for a
trademark with multiple words or numbers.6
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
A. Application of Intereening Statute: United States Olympic
Committee v. Toy Truck Lines, Inc.
In United States Olympic Committee v. Toy Truck Lines, Inc.,7 the
Federal Circuit reversed a decision by the Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board because the Board had improperly ignored an
intervening statute." The case arose when Toy Truck Lines filed an
"intent to use" application,9 which would allow the mark PAN
AMERICAN to be used on "miniature toy trucks and scale model
trucks.""0 The United States Olympic Committee (USOC) filed an
opposition based on its marks PAN AMERICAN GAMES, USA PAN
4. See Carefree Trading, Inc. v. Life Corp., No. 00-1274, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS
18833, at *14 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 16, 2001).
5. See In re Save Venice N.Y., Inc., 259 F.3d 1346, 1351-52, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1778, 1782 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (setting out a two-part test to determine whether a
geographic mark is "primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive"). The
.related goods test" measures whether a reasonably prudent consumer would
believe that non-competitive but related goods sold under similar marks derive from
the same source, or are affiliated with, connected with, or sponsored by the same
trademark owner." 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (West 1994 & Supp. V 1999).
6. See In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., 240 F.3d 1341, 1346, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1807, 1811 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that a mnemonic mark must be
examined "as a whole" or in its entirety, rather than in its component parts).
7. 237 F.3d 1331, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
8. Id. at 1334, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1382.
9. A party may file an "intent to use" application before it actually uses a
trademark in commerce if it files an affidavit confirming that it plans to use the mark
in commerce. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) (3) (B) (1994). The party must show evidence
of use in commerce before the mark is actually granted registration. Id. § 1051 (d).
10. United States Olympic Comm., 237 F.3d at 1332,57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1380.
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AM TEAM, and PAN AM GAMES for use with a variety of goods-but
not toy or scale model trucks." The USOC based its opposition on
sections 2(a) and 2(d) of the Lanham Act, 2 which prohibit
registration of marks "which falsely suggest a connection with
persons... institutions, beliefs, or national symbols"'3 or which would
be likely to "cause confusion" with a previously registered mark.
4
After the USOC had filed its opposition, the U.S. Congress
enacted, and the President signed into law, the Olympic and Amateur
Sports Act,' which stated that the USOC has the exclusive right to use
"the words... "Pan-American"... .,,"16 The Act further provided the
USOC with a civil cause of action against anyone who used, without
consent, the words as delineated in the statute, which carry the
potential to cause public confusion.
The USOC cited the new statute in its brief, but the Board declined
to consider it because the alleged violation of the new statute was not
a pleaded ground in the opposition.' The Board thus rejected the
USOC's opposition under the Lanham Act. 9 Without hesitation, the
Federal Circuit found that "[i] t was improper for the Board to refuse
to consider the 1998 enactment."20 The court reasoned that, because
Toy Truck Lines had not established an exception to the Supreme
Court's general rule that "a tribunal must apply the law as it exists at
the time of the decision,, 2' the Board should have considered the
22statute. The court explained that exceptions to the general rule are
applicable "when justice requires, such as when vested rights are
materially affected by the change in law."23 Determining when an
11. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1380.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
13. Id. § 1052(a).
14. Id. § 1052(d).
15. 36 U.S.C. § 220506 (Supp. V 1999).
16. Id. § 220506(a) (4).
17. Id. §§ 220506(c) (3)-(c) (4). The Act prohibits the use of:
(3) the words described in subsection (a) (4) of this section, or any
combination or simulation of those words tending to cause confusion or
mistake, to deceive, or to falsely suggest a connection with the [USOC] or
any Olympic, Paralympic, or Pan American Games activity; or (4) any
trademark, trade name, sign, symbol, or insignia falsely representing
association with, or authorization by, the International Olympic Committee,
the International Paralympic Committee, the Pan American Sports
Organization, or the [USOC].
Id.
18. United States Olympic Comm., 237 F.3d at 1333, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1381.
19. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1381.
20. Id. at 1334, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1381.
21. Saint Francis Coll. v. Al Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 608 (1987).
22. United States Olympic Comm., 237 F.3d at 1333, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1381.
23. Id. at 1334, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1382.
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exception is applicable requires consideration of whether the change
in the law produces new legal consequences, relative to the time prior
to the new provision. 4 According to the Federal Circuit, Toy Truck
Lines had no vested rights in the PAN AMERICAN mark because it
had filed its trademark application based on an intent to use the
mark rather than on actual use.25 The court found "no suggestion of
the existence of any vested property right or investment in trademark
use."26 The statute granted the USOC exclusive rights to use PAN
AMERICAN and required no showing of the likelihood of confusion
to enforce such rights.27 Therefore, the Federal Circuit held that the
Board's findings as to the likelihood of confusion were irrelevant
and, as a matter of law, the opposition should have been sustained.28
As a result, the court reversed and remandedY
B. Effective Use of Laches Defense: Bridgestone/Firestone Research,
Inc. v. Automobile Club de l'Ouest de la France
In Bridgestone/Firestone Research, Inc. v. Automobile Club de l'Ouest de la
France,-' the Federal Circuit again reversed the Board's decision and
criticized its misapplication of Bridgestone's use of the laches
defense.31 The Automobile Club petitioned to cancel Bridgestone's
mark LEMANS for "pneumatic rubber tires," a mark which
Bridgestone owned since 1963.32 Since 1923 the Automobile Club has
run a car race in Le Mans, France called "Les 24 Heurs du Mans."33
In 1986, the Automobile Club was granted a registration on the
24. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1382; see also Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511
U.S. 244 (1994). The Landgraf Court succinctly clarified the issue: "A statute does
not operate 'retrospectively' merely because it is applied in a case arising from
conduct antedating the statute's enactment, or upsets expectations based in prior
law. Rather, the court must ask whether the new provision attaches new legal
consequences to events completed before its enactment." Id. at 270 (citations
omitted).
25. United States Olympic Comm., 237 F.3d at 1334,57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1382.
26. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1382. But cf Warnervision Entm't Inc. v. Empire
of Carolina, Inc., 101 F.3d 259, 262 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding that a court may not
enjoin a party from making the use required for registration of an Intent to Use
(ITU) application on the grounds that another party has used the mark subsequent
to the filing of the ITU application).
27. United States Olympic Comm., 237 F.3d at 1334, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1382.
28. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1382; see also S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United
States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 531 (1987) (determining, under the Amateur
Sports Act of 1978, that enforcement protection granted to the USOC for use of
Olympic words and symbols does not require a showing of likelihood of confusion
and does not allow the unauthorized user the Lanham Act statutory defenses).
29. United States Olympic Comm., 237 F.3d at 1334,57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1382.
30. 245 F.3d 1359, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d 1460 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
31. Id. at 1363, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463.
32. Id. at 1360, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461.
33. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461.
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supplemental register for the mark LE MANS for "automobile tires,"
which Bridgestone successfully cancelled in 1991.m In the context of
that cancellation proceeding, the Automobile Club counterclaimed
for cancellation of Bridgestone's LEMANS registration and argued
that the registration "falsely suggested a connection with the
Automobile Club and its sponsorship of the Le Mans race, in
violation of § 2 (a) of the Lanham Act."'
Bridgestone denied the false connection and raised a laches
defense, asserting that the Automobile Club had "slept on its rights"
for too long, as twenty-seven years had passed since it acquired its
registration.36 The Board granted the Automobile Club's cancellation
and rejected Bridgestone's laches defense because "Bridgestone had
not provided adequate evidence of its reliance on the Automobile
Club's twenty-seven years of silence. 3 7 The Federal Circuit chastised
the Board for incorrectly requiring evidence of reliance., The
Federal Circuit's decision explained that even though a laches
defense requires a showing of undue or unreasonable delay and
prejudice resulting from such delay, such a defense does not require
evidence of reliance on the silence of the delaying party.
39
Bridgestone proffered uncontested evidence of its significant
investment in and promotion of LEMANS brand tires for twenty-
seven years.4 In confirming that this evidence would constitute the
requisite economic prejudice for a laches defense, the Federal Circuit
followed the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Hot Wax, Inc. v. Turtle
Wax, Inc.,4l stating that "[e] conomic prejudice arises from investment
in and development of the trademark, and the continued
commercial use and economic promotion of a mark over a long
period adds weight to the evidence of prejudice."42 The Federal
34. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461.
35. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461. Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act states that
a mark will be refused registration if it "falsely suggests a connection with persons,
living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols." 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (a).
36. Bridgestone/Firestone Research, 245 F.3d at 1360, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1462.
37. Id. at 1361-62, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461.
38. Id. at 1363, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463.
39. See id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463 (citing Lincoln Logs Ltd. v. Lincoln Pre-
Cut Log Homes, Inc., 971 F.2d 732, 735, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1701, 1704 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (explaining prejudice can take the form of loss of evidence or witnesses at
trial, or economic prejudice); see also A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co.,
960 F.2d 1020, 1042, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1336-37 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(identifying that "reliance is not a requirement of laches but is essential to equitable
estoppel").
40. See Bridgestone/Firestone Research, 245 F.3d at 1362, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1463 (explaining Bridegstone's use of the LEMANS mark on at least four kinds of
tires).
41. 191 F.3d 813,52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (7th Cir. 1999).
42. Bridgestone/Firestone Research, 245 F.3d at 1363, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463.
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Circuit held that "[t]he Board's ruling rested on an erroneous
interpretation of the law of laches, leading to an unreasonable
exercise of judgment."43 Therefore, the court found that the Board
abused its discretion by rejecting the defense of laches.J
The Automobile Club proffered two arguments in support of its
contention that laches was unavailable to Bridgestone and failed in
both attempts. First, it analogized this "false suggestion" case to cases
brought under section 2(d) of the Lanham Act based on the
"likelihood of confusion" doctrine.u In previous likelihood of
confusion cases, the Federal Circuit disallowed the equitable defenses
of laches and estoppel to cases where the public interest in avoiding
deception was at stake, and allowing continued use would have
harmed that interest.4 6 Here, the court rejected the Automobile
Club's analogy to "likelihood of confusion" doctrine and instead
relied on its previous determination in University of Notre Dame du Lac
v. J C. Gourmet Food Imports Co., Inc.47 to allow the use of the laches
defense. In f C. Gourmet Food Imports, the court held that rights
protected under the false suggestion provision are intended primarily
to protect individuals and institutions from exploitation.48  Thus,
again adopting the Seventh Circuit's doctrine in Hot Wax, the court
held that "the equitable defenses of laches and estoppel are not
barred in § 2(a) false suggestion cases, absent misrepresentation or
deceit."'49
Finally, the court quickly disposed of the Automobile Club's
second theory, which suggested that Bridgestone could not use a
laches defense because Bridgestone's use of LEMANS was a
"continuing wrong," for which every use constituted a new injury."0 In
fact, the court found, the "continuing wrong" theory cut in favor of
allowing Bridgestone's laches defense because "a party aggrieved by a
trademark use could delay filing suit indefinitely, while prejudice to
the trademark user increases."5'
43. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463.
44. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463.
45. See infra Part II.A (explaining the likelihood of confusion doctrine).
46. See, e.g., Ultra-White Co. v. Johnson Chem. Indus. Inc., 465 F.2d 891, 893-94,
175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 166, 167 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (stating that the public interest is the
dominant consideration for courts considering laches arguments); Chun King Corp.
v. Genil Plant Line, Inc., 403 F.2d 274, 276, 159 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 649, 651 (C.C.P.
1968) (emphasizing consideration of public interest as a relevant factor in
discussions of the laches doctrine).
47. 703 F.2d 1372, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 505 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
48. Id. at 1376, 159 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 509.
49. Bridgestone/Firestone Research, 245 F.3d at 1363, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463.
50. Id. at 1364, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463.
51. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463.
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C. Premature Grant of Summaty Judgment: Carefree Trading, Inc. v.
Life Corp.
In an unpublished opinion captioned Carefree Trading, Inc. v. Life
Corp., 2 the Federal Circuit again expressed its discontent with the
actions of the tribunal below. This time the Federal Circuit vacated a
federal district judge's grant of summary judgment and delved into
the details of procedure and discovery.
5 3
This case's path to the Federal Circuit is interesting since the
appeal was predicated on the Federal Circuit's exclusive jurisdiction
with respect to patent claims. 4  Carefree manufactured and sold
cardiopulmonary resuscitation ("CPR") face masks under its
registered LIFE MASK mark.5 Life Corp. sold emergency oxygen
units, including CPR masks, under the registered marks LIFE
CORPORATION, LIFE COPORATION OXYGEN PAC and LIFE-02.
Before the Board, Life Corp. successfully cancelled Carefree's mark
based on a likelihood of confusion. 6
Carefree appealed the Board's decision by filing a complaint in
federal district court in Arizona and added patent infringement
claims to its complaint.57 Life Corp. initially brought counterclaims
alleging trademark infringement, antitrust violations, and unfair
competition.58 Subsequently, all claims, except for those related to
the cancellation of the LIFE MASK mark, were either withdrawn or
dismissed.'59  The district court granted Life Corp.'s summary
judgment motion regarding the cancellation claim, thereby affirming
the Board's decision. 6° Carefree appealed to the Federal Circuit.
61
Normally, the case would have been appealed to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.6  However, because federal
jurisdiction was partially based on the patent claims under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338, and the Federal Circuit enjoys exclusive jurisdiction over
52. No. 11-1274, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 18833 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 16, 2001).
53. Id. at *4.
54. See id. (noting that the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction over patent claims under
28 U.S.C. § 1295 remains despite the district court's dismissal of the patent claims
with prejudice).
55. Id. at *I.
56. Id.
57. Id. at *4. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(1), a party dissatisfied with the
decision of the Board may have a remedy through a civil action heard by a U.S.
district court.
58. Carefree Trading, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 18833, at *2-3.
59. Id. at *3.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See id. at *4 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)) (describing a party's options for
appeal after a cancellation proceeding).
63. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (providing federal district courts
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matters arising in part under the patent laws,64 the court accepted
jurisdiction of the case.6e Citing its decision in Zenith Electronics Corp.
v. Exzec Inc.,6 the Federal Circuit stated that its "exclusive jurisdiction
over matters arising in part under the patent laws is not defeated by
the fact that the patent claims have been dismissed with prejudice."67
In terms of the substance of the appeal, Carefree argued that the
grant of summary judgment was premature because it did not have a
chance to conduct sufficient discovery to respond to Life Corp.'s
motion." In March 1999, Life Corp. had filed its summary judgment
motion in the U.S. District Court in Arizona and followed with a
motion to stay discovery pending a decision on summary judgment in
July 1999.69 In September 1999, the case was reassigned to a new
district court judge, and Carefree argued that it could not obtain the
discovery it needed from Life Corp. to respond to the summary
judgment motion.70 Per the court's suggestion, Carefree filed a
motion to compel discovery, which the district court granted on
December 6, 1999 (after denying Life Corp.'s motion to stay
discovery in November 1999). 7' The district court granted Life
Corp.'s summary judgment motion onJanuary 28, 2000.72
Carefree argued that it had just received Life Corp.'s discovery
responses, and that it did not have the opportunity to address
deficiencies in the responses or depose key witnesses identified in the
responses when the court made its summary judgment ruling.7 3 The
Federal Circuit agreed, vacating the grant of summary judgment and
directing the district court to allow Carefree to conduct additional
discovery.74 The court, however, expressly limited its ruling to the
"unique circumstances of this case"75 and specified that the decision
"should not be read as a criticism of the district court., 76
with original jurisdiction in patent and trademark cases).
64. Carefree Trading, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 18833, at *5.
65. Id. at *4-5.
66. See 182 F.3d 1340, 1346, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1337, 1341-42 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(holding that a patent claim's dismissal with prejudice by a lower court does not
negate the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit).
67. Carefree Trading, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 18833, at *5.68. Id. at*3.
69. Id. at*6-8.
70. Id. at *6-7.71. Id. at *9-11.
72. Id. at*11.
73. Carefree Trading, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 18833, at *11-12.
74. Id. at *14.
75. Id. at *12.
76. Id. at*14.
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D. No Review For Prevailing Party: Jurassic Stone Co. v. Solnhofen
Natural Stone, Inc.
In another unpublished decision, Jurassic Stone Co. v. Solnhofen
Natural Stone, Inc.,77 the Federal Circuit refused to review a decision of
the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board regarding a petition for
cancellation. Jurassic Stone prevailed before the Board in its petition
for cancellation of the mark SOLNHOFEN on the ground that it was
primarily geographically descriptive. 8 Jurassic Stone then attempted
to appeal the decision to the Federal Circuit in order to request
cancellation of the mark on an additional ground-fraud before the
trademark examiner.79 The Federal Circuit found that Jurassic Stone
failed to show that relief on the alternative ground would alter the
legal interests of the parties.80 Thus, "the sole issue of its appeal [was]
moot.
8
'
The court implied that it might have found the appeal frivolous
(thus giving rise to a claim for attorney's fees by Solnhofen) if
Solnhofen had made a motion charging it as such under Rule 38' of
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.83 In the absence of such a
motion, however, the court expressly declined to make findings sua
sponte as to whether the appeal was frivolous as filed or argued.8
II. SUBSTANTIVE TRADEMARK ISSUES
On the substantive side, most surprising in 2001 is the relative
dearth of cases examining likelihood of confusion between
trademarks. The Federal Circuit published only one opinion in
which this was the main issue. Instead, the 2001 term focused on
cases involving trademark descriptiveness, misdescriptiveness, or
genericness. The Board's decisions fared well in these cases, with the
77. No. 11-1329, 2001 WL 131092 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 14, 2001).
78. Id. at *1.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.; see also Nasatka v. Delta Scientific Corp., 58 F.3d 1578, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (dismissing the case because proceedings in the district
court, rescinding the finding of inadequacy and resulting sanctions, mooted the
appeal).
82. See FED. R. APP. P. 38 ("If a court of appeals determines that an appeal is
frivolous, it may, after a separately filed motion or notice from the court and
reasonable oeportunity to respond, award just damages and single or double costs to
the appellee. ).
83. Jurassic Stone, 2001 WL 131092, at *1.
84. Id.
85. Han Beauty, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., 236 F.3d 1333, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1557 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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Federal Circuit reversing the Board in only one of the court's six
decisions addressing substantive issues.
A. Likelihood of Confusion: Broad Protection for "Family" of Marks:
Han Beauty, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co.
In 2001, the court addressed one likelihood of confusion case. In a
trademark infringement case, an opposition, or a cancellation
proceeding, the central issue is usually whether the defendant's
goods or services are likely to cause confusion to a significant
segment of the population because they cannot discern the
defendant's goods from the plaintiffs goods or services.8 Unlike
most circuits, in the Federal Circuit the likelihood of confusion
between marks is a question of law, which the court reviews de novo.87
The Federal Circuit reviews underlying factual findings, such as
trademark similarity or similarity in the characteristics of the goods,
under the "clearly erroneous" standard set forth in Rule 52 (a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.s
Determining the scope of protection afforded to a "family" of
marks presents a difficult issue in likelihood of confusion cases.n The
Federal Circuit's family analysis was central in a likelihood of
confusion case relating to hair-care products. In Han Beauty, Inc. v.
Alberto-Culver Co.,90 the court affirmed the Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board's decision sustaining Alberto-Culver's opposition to the
registration of Han Beauty's mark for its hair-care products based on
the likelihood of confusion, and stressed that in the context of
inexpensive products with potentially unsophisticated purchasers, a
family of marks enjoys strong protection.9'
In 1994, Han Beauty applied for registration for the mark
TREVIVE NUTRIENTS FOR THE LIFE OF YOUR HAIR and
86. JEROMiE GILsON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 5.01[1], at 5-8,
§ 5.02[3], at 5-41 (1974).
87. Id. § 8.14, at 8-346. The majority of other circuits treat the inquiry as an issue
of fact and uphold lower court decisions regarding likelihood of confusion absent
.clear error." See id. § 8.14, at 8-340.
88. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) ("Findings of fact... shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous"); see also Elec. Design & Sales, Inc. v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp.,
954 F.2d 713, 715, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1388, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (overturning
the Board's finding of a likelihood of confusion on the grounds that the Board
incorporated doubtful findings of fact).
89. A "family" of marks exists where one owner has many marks sharing common
elements. See, e.g., J. & J. Snackfoods Corp. v. McDonald's Corp., 932 F.2d 1460,
1463, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1889, 1891 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (explaining that a family of marks is
achieved when the pattern of usage indicates the origin of the family).
90. 236 F.3d 1333, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1557 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
91. Id. at 1337-38, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1560.
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DESIGN.92 Alberto-Culver opposed the registration based on a
likelihood of confusion with its hair-care products sold under its
family of marks with the prefix "TRES.
93
Alberto-Culver used and acquired trademark rights in numerous
marks beginning with the prefix "TRES" for various hair-care
products.Y In 1959, it acquired rights to use the mark TRESEMME
for hair-care products and has continuously used the mark. 95 From
the early 1960s until approximately 1980, Alberto-Culver also used
the marks TRESNET for hair spray, TRESLAK for hair lacquer, and
TRESOXIDE for peroxide used to bleach hair. 6 It also began
marketing a protein hair conditioning treatment under the
TRESPAC mark.97 In addition, from 1984 to the 1990s, Alberto-
Culver introduced additional hair-care products sold under the
following marks: TRESSPRAY, TRESWAVE, TRESMEND,
TRESGLAZE, TRESLIFT, TRESHOLD, and TRESSHINE.98 In many
cases, the products were marketed in a black plastic bottle, and the
marks, along with the word "European," appeared on the label.9
Alberto-Culver owned trademark registrations for the marks
TRESEMME, TRESPAC, TRESSPRAY, TRESGELEE, TRESWAVE,
and TRESHOLD °° Alberto-Culver sold and continues to sell all of its
products as part of the TRESEMME product line with the
TRESEMME mark displayed prominently on the packaging of all of
the products.' '
The court first examined the Board's finding that Alberto-Culver's
"TRES" marks constituted a family of marks. The court applied the
test set forth in j. &j Snack Foods Corp. v. McDonald's Corp.,"'2 which
states that "' [a] family of marks is a group of marks having a
recognizable common characteristic", 0 3  which "arises if the
purchasing public recognizes that the common characteristic is
indicative of a common origin of goods.'0 4  The court found
substantial evidence for the Board's finding that Alberto-Culver had
92. Id. at 1335, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558.
93. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558.
94. Id. at 1334, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558.
95. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558.
96. Han Beauty, 236 F.3d at 1335, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558.
97. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558.
98. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558.
99. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558.
100. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558.
101. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558.
102. 932 F.2d 1460, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1889 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
103. Han Beauty, 236 F.3d at 1336, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1559 (quotingJ. &J
Snack Foods Corp., 932 F.2d at 1462, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1892).
104. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1559.
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created a family of marks with the TRES prefix, noting that Han
Beauty had admitted as much in front of the Board, and that
Alberto-Culver had used TRES-prefix marks for at least thirty years,
before Han Beauty's attempted registration of the TREVIVE mark.1 5
The court then turned to the Board's assessment of the
"dimensions of protection properly afforded to the 'TRES' family
element."'"6 To do this, the court performed a detailed analysis of the
pronunciation of the "TRES" element of the mark, both by itself and
when pronounced with some of the Alberto-Culver suffixes.0 7 The
Board found that both the "TRE" in TREVIVE and the "TRES" in
Alberto-Culver's marks were similar in sound and commonly
pronounced "Tray."''
Han Beauty resisted this conclusion by presenting evidence that,
with respect to several of the so-called family members, consumers
commonly pronounced the prefix "TRESS," which differs from the
pronunciation of its mark.'09 The Board relied on a declaration of a
French professor who said that both "TRE" in TREVIVE and the
"TRES" terms would be perceived as French or French-derived terms
and thus pronounced "TRAY," rendering each term indistinguishable
from the other."0 The reliance on a French professor to determine
the pronunciation that the general public would attribute to a certain
term seems questionable; a French professor likely would be more
inclined to find a French pronunciation than ordinary U.S.
consumers, most of whom do not speak French."' However, both the
Board and the court were willing to accept these findings as evidence
of similarity sufficient to overcome Han Beauty's evidence of differing
pronunciations."'
In addition, the court looked to the declaration of Han Beauty's
national sales director, stating that, "' [TREVIVE] had almost a
continental French flare [sic] to it which I think is nice. "'1 Even
taking this statement into account, it is difficult to see how substantial
evidence supported the prQposition that the general public would
105. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1559.
106. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1559.
107. Id. at 1336-37, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1559.
108. Id. at 1336, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1559.
109. Han Beauty, 236 F.3d at 1336, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1559.
110. Id. at 1337, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1559-60.
111. In fact, the non-French-speaking author of this article pronounced the
"TRES" marks "TRESS" before reading the case.
112. Han Beauty, 236 F.3d at 1337,57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1560.
113. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1560 (quoting Han Beauty, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver
Co., opposition no. 99,090 ser. No. 74/519,598, slip op. at 3 (Trademark Tr. & App.
Bd. Mar. 10, 1999)).
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necessarily pronounce the two prefixes the same way. Nonetheless,
applying the deferential "substantial evidence" standard reserved for
questions of fact, the court upheld the finding that "TRES" and
"TRE" would be pronounced identically; therefore, the "TRES" marks
and the TREVIVE mark "created similar commercial impressions."
4
In approving the Board's broad protection for the "TRES" family of
marks, the court distinguished several cases, such as Witco Chemical Co.
v. Whitfield Chemical Co.," 5 that limit the scope of family elements used
to exclude terms with different features. In Witco Chemical, the
Federal Circuit held that WHIT prefix marks were not likely to cause
confusion with WIT prefix marks.116  The Han Beauty Court
distinguished the earlier case by noting that, in Witco Chemical, there
were differences in the "nature and character of the goods,
differences in channels of trade," and noted that the goods in that
case were marketed to more sophisticated consumers who the court
felt would be able to distinguish between WHIT and WIT prefix
marks."7 Apparently, neither the Board nor the Federal Circuit had
the same degree of faith in the product-discerning abilities of hair
lacquer purchasers.
In reaching their respective decisions, both the court and the
Board failed to address many of the "Dupont factors," the elements
which the Dupont Court declared pertinent for the Federal Circuit's
analysis in determinations on the likelihood of confusion generated
by a mark."8 Han Beauty reminds us that not all of the Dupont factors
114. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1560.
115. 418 F.2d 1403, 164 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 43 (C.G.P.A. 1969).
116. See id. at 1406, 164 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 45 (finding that the "probable
purchaser" of such goods would have "no difficulty" distinguishing the differences
between the products in question).
117. Han Beauty, 236 F.2d at 1337,57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1560.
118. In re E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 563, 567 (C.C.P.A 1973). The Dupont court stated that the court must
consider the following factors:
(1) The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to
appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression.
(2) The similirity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as
described in an application or registration or in connection with which a
prior mark is in use.
(3) The similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade
channels.
(4) The conditions under which and buyers to whom sales are made, i.e.
"impulse" vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing.
(5) The fame of the prior mark (sales, advertising, length of use).
(6) The number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods.
(7) The nature and extent of any actual confusion.
(8) The length of time during and conditions under which there has been
concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion.
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are created equal in any particular case." 9  While the Board
considered the similarity of the sound of the marks and the similarity
of the goods sold under the marks, both of which are important
Dupont factors, it failed to expressly comment on either the strength
of the family of "TRES" marks or the absence of evidence showing
actual confusion between the products. 20 While acknowledging the
lack of expressed findings regarding these two elements, the court
was not particularly concerned, stating that "the Board need not
discuss every factor, but may focus its analysis on dispositive factors,
such as similarity of the marks and relatedness of the goods." 21 In
making such a determination, however, the court noted that the
record showed that the same salons sold Han Beauty products and
Alberto-Culver products, sometimes side-by-side, and still no evidence
revealed actual confusion.
122
The lack of actual confusion in Han Beauty-where the category of
goods was identical, inexpensive, and sold side by side in salons to
both sophisticated and unsophisticated consumers-is the
consummate example of when lack of actual confusion should be a
significant factor mitigating against a finding of likelihood of
confusion. This factor should be particularly important in a case
where even the similarity in pronunciation of the marks-put forth as
the main factor in the likelihood of confusion here-was disputed.
However, even though Han Beauty submitted evidence that the
products under both marks were sold in the same salons, it failed to
set forth the length of time both marks appeared in the salons or the
(9) The variety of goods on which a mark is or is not used (house mark,
"family" mark, product mark).
(10) The market interface between applicant and the owner of a prior mark:
(a) a mere "consent" to register or use.
(b) agreement provisions designed to preclude confusion, i.e. limitations on
continued use of the marks by each party.
(c) assignment of mark, application, registration and good will of the related
business.
(d) laches and estoppel attributable to owner of prior mark and indicative of
lack of confusion.
(11) The extent to which applicant has a right to exclude others from use of
its mark on its goods.
(12) The extent of potential confusion, i.e., whether de minimis or
substantial.
(13) Any other established fact probative of the effect of use.
119. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 946, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d
1842 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (acknowledging that only those factors relevant to the record
need to be considered in a particular case).
120. See Han Beauty, 236 F.3d at 1338,57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1560.
121. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1560.
122. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1560-61.
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circumstances under which they were marketed. In stating that
"extended periods of side-by-side sales without actual confusion may
tend to refute a likelihood of confusion,"'' 3 the court indicated that
Han Beauty's failure to submit relevant evidence harmed its position.
B. Little Protection for "Puffing"--Laudatory Marks
A mark is "descriptive" if it "immediately conveys... knowledge of
the ingredients, qualities, or characteristics of the goods or services
with which it is used."124 Pursuant to the Lanham Act, a descriptive
mark is not registrable absent a showing of secondary meaning or
acquired distinctiveness, i.e., a showing that consumers identify the
owner of the mark as the source of goods or services sold under the
mark. 12
In 2001, in the area of descriptiveness, the Federal Circuit
123. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1560-61. The federal circuit courts weigh the
probative value of the element of lack of actual confusion differently. The Sixth
Circuit has noted that "[d]ue to the difficulty of securing evidence of actual
confusion, a lack of such evidence is rarely significant." Daddy's Junky Music Stores,
Inc. v. Big Daddy's Family Music Ctr., 109 F.3d 275, 284, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1173,
1180 (6th Cir. 1997); see also Beer Nuts v. Clover Club Foods Co., 805 F.2d 920, 928,
231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 913, 918 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that lack of actual confusion
does not support a finding of no likelihood of confusion when the goods are
inexpensive because "[p]urchasers are unlikely to bother to inform the trademark
owner when they are confused about an inexpensive product.").
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit affords lack of actual confusion more weight when
the duration of co-existence is extensive, stating that "[w]e cannot think of more
persuasive evidence that there is no likelihood of confusion between these two marks
than the fact that they have been simultaneously used for five years without causing
any consumers to be confused as to who makes what." Brookfield Communications,
Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1050, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1553-
54 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co., 50 F.3d 189, 205, 33
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1812 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating that "[i]f a defendant's product
has been sold for an appreciable period of time without evidence of actual
confusion, one can infer that continued marketing will not lead to consumer
confusion in the future. The longer the challenged product has been in use, the
stronger this inference will be."); Lever Bros. v. Am. Bakeries Co., 693 F.2d 251, 257,
216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 177, 182 (2d Cir. 1982) ("Although actual confusion need not
be shown by [the Appellant], substantial sales of both products over several years,
without a single example of actual confusion, becomes significant."); Aktiebolaget
Electrolux v. Armatron Int'l, Inc., 999 F.2d 1, 4, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1460, 1462-63
(1st Cir. 1993) (asserting that "an absence of actual confusion, or a negligible
amount of it, between two products after a long period of coexistence on the market
is highly probative in showing that little likelihood of confusion exists"). The
Restatement of Unfair Competition lends further credence to this view, declaring
that "when the parties have made significant use of their respective designations in
the same geographic market for a substantial period of time, the absence of any
evidence of actual confusion may in some cases justify an inference that the actor's
use does not create a likelihood of confusion." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 23 cmt. d (1995).
124. In re Quik-Print Copy Shops, Inc., 616 F.2d 523, 525, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 505,
507 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
125. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1994).
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reaffirmed the doctrine set forth in In re the Boston Beer Co. Ltd.
Partnership,26 which stated that marks that are merely laudatory and
descriptive of the alleged merit of goods or services are regarded as
"descriptive," and therefore, not registrable absent a showing of
secondary meaning. Such laudatory marks are descriptive because,
as Boston Beer explained, they simply state the characteristics or quality
of the goods in condensed form.2 8 In the two cases the Federal
Circuit reviewed in 2001, it emphasized that a slogan faces an uphill
battle in establishing that it deserves trademark protection when it
merely expounds the virtues of its related goods.
1. The ultimate bike rack: descriptive or suggestive?
Although a descriptive term requires proof of secondary meaning
to qualify for federal registration, if a mark "requires imagination,
thought, and perception" to arrive at "the qualities or characteristics
of the goods" then the mark is "suggestive" and does not require such
proof of secondary meaning to establish registrability.2 9 In In re Nett
Designs, Inc., 3"o the Federal Circuit displayed the vast discretion that
the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board holds in determining where a
term falls on the spectrum between descriptiveness and
suggestiveness.'31 The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's denial of
reconsideration of a trademark examiner's requirement that an
applicant disclaim part of the mark to be used on the applicant's bike
racks.
32
Nett Designs applied to register the mark LOAD LLAMA THE
ULTIMATE BIKE RACK, for "carrying racks for mounting on
bicycles, accessories for bicycle racks, namely attachments for
expanding the carrying capacity of a carrying rack for mounting on
bicycles, and bungee cords sold together as a unit with such carrying
racks." 33 The examiner had required Nett Designs to disclaim THE
ULTIMATE BIKE RACK, and Nett Designs refused."M Upon the
Board's review, Nett Designs attempted to present a list of 158
126. 198 F.3d 1370, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
127. Id. at 1374, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058.
128. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058.
129. In re Gyulay, 820 F.2d 1216, 1217, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1009, 1009 (Fed. Cir.
1987).
130. 236 F.3d 1339, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1564 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
131. See id. at 1341-42, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566 (describing terms such as
"ultimate" as having both descriptive and suggestive aspects, and noting that "the
duty to place [a] term in its proper context within the mark and to determine the
public's perception" rests with the Board).
132. Id. at 1340, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1565.
133. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1565.
134. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1565.
2002]
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
registered marks containing the word ULTIMATE, but the Board
refused to consider the list.135 Nett Designs took an ex parte appeal to
the Federal Circuit.
3 6
In its review, the Federal Circuit considered whether there was
substantial evidence of the Board's finding that the phrase THE
ULTIMATE BIKE RACK was descriptive, i.e., just a laudatory
description of Nett Designs' products, rather than suggestive. 7 The
court outlined the rules that explain the blurred lines between a
descriptive mark and a suggestive one. '3 After reviewing the Board's
evidence, including dictionary definitions of the term "ULTIMATE"' 39
and Nett Designs' specifics of use,' 4 the court concluded that there
was substantial evidence supporting the Board's finding that, in the
context, consumers would "immediately regard THE ULTIMATE
BIKE RACK as a laudatory descriptive phrase that touts the
superiority of Nett Designs' bike racks.'' Thus, applying Boston Beer,
the court found that the mark was descriptive.' Because Nett
Designs failed to present evidence of secondary meaning, the court
affirmed the Board's decision to deny that portion of the mark
trademark protection.
43
Like the Board, the Federal Circuit gave little consideration to Nett
Designs' presentation of evidence of the 158 other registrations
containing the term ULTIMATE. T'' The court reiterated that a term
might be descriptive or suggestive depending on the context in which
it is used. Without citing any authority, the court went on to state
that even if there were other ULTIMATE marks that had
characteristics of Nett Designs' mark, the Board is not bound by the
135. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1565.
136. See 15 U.S.C. § 1070 (allowing any final decision of the examiner in charge of
registering marks to be appealed to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board upon
payment of the prescribed fee).
137. See Nett Designs, 236 F.3d at 1341-42, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1565-66.
138. See id. at 1341, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566 ("[A] term may slide along the
continuum between suggestiveness and descriptiveness depending on usage, context,
and other factors that affect the relevant public perception of the term.").
139. Id. at 1342, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566 (defining ultimate as "representing
or exhibiting the greatest possible development or sophistication: the ultimate
bicycle") (quoting THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(3d ed. 1992)).
140. See Nett Designs, 236 F.3d at 1342, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566 (noting that
Nett Designs' advertising brochure stated "[t]he 'Load Llama The Ultimate Bike
Rack' allows users of bicycles to enjoy the ride without constant apprehension that
carried-along objects may fall off the carrier").
141. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566.
142. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566.
143. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566.
144. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566.
145. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566.
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allowance of such prior registrations. 14' Thus, the court found no
error in the Board's neglect of the evidence of prior registrations.
Once the Board made its determination, based on substantial
evidence, that this particular mark sat on the descriptive end of the
continuum, no amount of prior registrations, no matter how similar
to the proposed mark, would have been reason for the Federal
Circuit to find error in such decision. This disregard for prior
registrations, and the minimal persuasive value of prior registrations,
reinforces the notion that trademark examiners and the Board have
great discretion in choosing to examine other marks when making
registration determinations because each mark is looked at in context
and on its own merits.147 From a practitioner's standpoint, lack of
uniformity and non-adherence to precedent makes it difficult to
advise clients about the potential success of obtaining registration for
a particular mark; therefore, this uncertainty should be revisited by
the Federal Circuit or addressed by legislation.
2. Thefirst name infloorcare: Hoover Co. v. Royal Appliance
Manufacturing Co.
In Hoover Co. v. Royal Appliance Manufacturing Co., 48 the Federal
Circuit found itself examining laudatory advertising slogans-this
time in the context of an opposition action by one vacuum cleaner
manufacturer against another. In the end, the court affirmed the
Board's ruling, which (1) rejected the opposition, finding that
Hoover did not have a trademark with which to put forth the
challenge, and (2) found that Royal's mark was not deceptively
misdescriptive149
Hoover challenged Royal's application for the mark THE FIRST
NAME IN FLOORCARE because it considered the mark likely to
cause confusion with Hoover's mark NUMBER ONE IN
FLOORCARE"' Because Hoover's mark was not registered, it
needed to establish that the NUMBER ONE IN FLOORCARE mark
was distinctive of its goods "either inherently or through the
acquisition of secondary meaning"'51 before it could challenge Royal's
146. NettDesigns, 236 F.3d at 1342, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566.
147. See id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566 (advancing the idea that extensive prior
registrations of a term does not eliminate the potential for the term to be deemed
descriptive, and that such a determination hinges on the context in which the term is
used).
148. 238 F.3d 1357, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1720 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
149. Id. at 1361, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1723.
150. Id. at 1359,57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1723.
151. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1723.
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application. 152 In the end, Hoover seemed just a little too smug in
touting its "number one" designation and failed to convince the
Board or the court that its mark deserved trademark protection.
53
First, Hoover argued that its mark was inherently distinctive,
indicating a single source of goods, because it really was "number one
in floorcare" and no other company could use the phrase with "equal
truth."154 This contention, of course, simply confirmed the laudatory
nature of the phrase. If Hoover eventually fell out of the top position
in floorcare, as the court explained, the next "number one" should
then be entitled to use the designation to describe itself.'55 Hoover
offered the same argument in different packaging when it tried to
establish in the alternative that if the mark were descriptive, it had
acquired distinctiveness in the marketplace. 55 It contended that the
slogan had "evolved as a second-hand identity as a consequence of
consumer recognition of Hoover's first place position in every
recognized category in the floorcare industry." 57 With only minimal
evidence of the use of the slogan and no consumer surveys regarding
perception or brand recognition, the court determined that the
current industry rankings provided insufficient evidence to reverse
the Board's finding that the mark was not distinctive of [Hoover's]
goods in commerce.'5'
Hoover then tried to block Royal's registration by establishing that
THE FIRST NAME IN FLOORCARE was either "deceptive" under
section 2(a) of the Lanham Act 159 or "deceptively misdescriptive"
when used in connection with Royal's products under section 2 (e) of
the Lanham Act.160 Under the Federal Circuit's three-part test set
forth in In re Budge Manufacturing Co.,' 61 to determine whether a mark
is deceptive, the court must ask: "(1) Is the term misdescriptive of the
152. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1723; see also Towers v. Advent Software, Inc., 913
F.2d 942, 945, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1039, 1041 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (ruling that an
entity opposing the registration of a trademark, on the grounds of a likelihood of
confusion with its own unregistered term, must initially establish the distinctiveness
of its unregistered term).
153. See Hoover, 238 F.3d at 1360, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1722 (concluding the
"Number One in Floorcare" slogan "[was] not inherently distinctive and had not
acquired distinctiveness").
154. Id. at 1359, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1722.
155. Id. at 1360, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1722.
156. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1722.
157. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1722.
158. Id. at 1360-61, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1722-23. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f)
(indicating that a mark acquires secondary meaning if it becomes "distinctive of the
applicant's goods in commerce").
159. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2000) (barring registration of marks "consist[ing] of
or compris[ing] ... deceptive ... matter").
160. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e).
161. 857 F.2d 773, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1259 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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character, quality, function or use of the goods? (2) If so, are
prospective purchasers likely to believe that the misdescription
actually describes the goods? and (3) If so, is the misdescription likely
to affect the decision to purchase?" 16
Hoover and Royal each presented arguments concerning the
connotations that THE FIRST NAME IN FLOORCARE would evoke
in consumers' minds. Hoover argued that "The First Name" would
be perceived as meaning that Royal was "number one" in floorcare, a
position that Hoover again reminded the court that it held.6 Royal
contended that "The First Name" suggested "general familiarity, as in
being on a 'first name' basis with an individual."'' The court sided
with Royal and concluded that the slogan was not misdescriptive of
Royal's goods.'6 Without a detailed analysis of the Budge factors, the
court reviewed the facts under the "substantial evidence" standard
reserved for questions of fact.166 It found that, although both Hoover
and Royal proposed plausible connotations, substantial evidence
supported the Board's decision that Royal's connotation was
defensible and the slogan was not deceptive or deceptively
misdescriptive of Royal's goods.'67
C. Primarily Geographically Deceptively Misdescriptive: In re Save Venice
New York, Inc.
Under section 2 (e) (3) of the Lanham Act, a mark is not eligible for
federal registration if, "when used on or in connection with the goods
of the applicant [it] is primarily geographically deceptively
misdescriptive" of such goods.'6 In In re Save Venice New York, Inc.,
69
the Federal Circuit affirmed the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board's
decision, which denied registration to a mark consisting of the
phrases "THE VENICE COLLECTION" and "SAVE VENICE INC." as
well as an image of the winged lion of St. Mark.179
Save Venice New York, Inc. was a non-profit corporation "devoted
to preserving and restoring some of the cultural treasures of Venice,
Italy."1'7 It sought registration for the mark described above to cover
162. Id. at 775, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260.
163. Hoover Co. v. Royal Appliance Mfg. Co., 238 F.3d 1357, 1361, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1720, 1723 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
164. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1723.
165. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1723.
166. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1723.
167. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1723.
168. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (3).
169. 259 F.3d 1346, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1778 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
170. Id. at 1349, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780.
171. Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780.
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a variety of products, including potpourri, silverware, lamps, clocks,
furniture, glass products, and carpets. 172  None of the goods
originated from Venice except for some glassware, which was not part
of the disputed application. 73 The court first noted that both the
decision of whether a mark is primarily geographically misdescriptive
and whether a geographic location is known for particular goods are
questions of fact; therefore, the court reviewed the issues under the
substantial evidence standard.
7 4
The court approved the Board's application of the Federal
Circuit's two-part test, set forth in In re Wada,'75 to determine whether
the mark is primarily geographically misdescriptive. 7 6  ada
places the initial burden on the examiner to determine whether
"(1) the mark's primary significance is a generally known geographic
location; and (2) consumers would reasonably believe the applicant's
goods are connected with the geographic location in the mark, when
in fact they are not.
177
In its analysis under the test's first prong, the court noted that as a
"composite," a mark composed of several words and an image, the
mark must be evaluated "as a whole."178 Yet, when the examiners
evaluate "composite" marks, they may also consider the significance
of each separate element of the mark.'79 The Board found that the
mark's most prominent part was the phrase "THE VENICE
COLLECTION," which was displayed prominently at the top of the
mark and created "an unmistakable reference to Venice, Italy."'8° In
172. Id. at 1350, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780.
173. Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780.
174. Id. at 1351, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1781; see also On-Line Careline v. Am.
Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1085, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(instructing that the substantial evidence standard "requires the reviewing court to
ask whether a reasonable person might find that the evidentiary record supports the
agency's conclusion," and stressing that the standard "necessitates a stricter judicial
review of agency factfinding"); In re Compagnie Generale Mar., 993 F.2d 841, 845, 26
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1652, 1655 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (denying a French corporation's
application to register the mark "French Line" for a host of goods and services
because the mark was primarily geographically descriptive); In re Loew's Theatres,
Inc., 769 F.2d 764, 765, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 865, 866 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (sustaining the
denial of registration of the "Durango" mark for chewing tobacco because the mark
would be primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive).
175. 194 F.3d 1297, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
176. Save Venice, 259 F.3d at 1352, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1781.
177. Wada, 194 F.3d at 1300, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1540.
178. Save Venice, 259 F.3d at 1352, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1782.
179. Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1782; see also In re Nat'l Data Corp., 753 F.2d
1056, 1058, 224 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding that it is proper
to examine the significance of each individual component of a mark, even though
the question of likelihood of confusion must be resolved by examination of the mark
in its entirety).
180. Save Venice, 259 F.3d at 1352, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1782.
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addition, the examiner presented evidence of a gazetteer, an
encyclopedia, published books, and web sites establishing that the
Lion of St. Mark used in the mark appears on the Venetian flag and
on many statues in Venice.18' The court found this evidence
sufficiently substantial for the examiner to establish a prima facie case
that the significance of the mark was primarily geographic and that it
signified Venice, Italy.'8
The Board rejected Save Venice's argument that the mark was
incontestable because the primary portion of its mark was SAVE
VENICE, INC. and Save Venice had a registration for SAVE VENICE
for "fundraising services" dating back to 19912' A mark is
incontestable, meaning that the registrant can rely on it as conclusive
evidence of its validity, registrant's ownership, and exclusive right to
use it in connection with the goods and services listed in the
application, when the mark has been on the principal register and in
continuous use for five years.8 However, as the court stated, a mark's
incontestable status carries preemptive weight "only in the form
registered and for the goods and services claimed."'a' Here, the
goods and services at issue differed from the "fundraising services" in
the previous registration. 86 In addition, the Board determined that
the new mark was completely different graphically than the SAVE
VENICE mark because "Save Venice" was only displayed in small font
at the bottom of the disputed mark, which was dominated by THE
VENICE COLLECTION, and the registered mark did not contain the
image of the Lion of St. Mark. 87 In light of this, the court agreed
with the Board's analysis that rejected Save Venice's incontestability
argument.
181. Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1782.
182. Id. at 1352-53, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1782. The court noted that it had
previously held that even less evidence of primarily geographic significance would
suffice for the prima facie showing. By way of example, the court noted that a
dictionary definition of "Durango" provided sufficient evidence to establish a prima
facie showing in In re Loew's Theatres. Save Venice, 259 F.3d at 1353, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1782 (citing In re Loew's Theatres, Inc., 769 F.2d 764, 766, 226 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 865, 866 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
183. Save Venice, 259 F.3d at 1353, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1782.
184. See 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1994) (listing the pre-conditions to qualifying a
registered mark as "incontestable"); 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (1994) (providing that once
the usage rights of a registered mark have become "incontestable" under 15 U.S.C.
§ 1065, then "the registration shall be conclusive evidence" of the validity,
registration, ownership, and exclusive right to use the mark).
185. Save Venice, 259 F.3d at 1353, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1782 (citing In re
Merrill Lynch, 828 F.2d 1567, 1568, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1141, 1141 (Fed. Cir.
1987)).
186. Save Venice, 259 F.3d at 1353, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1782.
187. Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1783.
188. Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1783.
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The court then analyzed the second prong of the test, the
"goods/place association test." The court considered "whether the
public would reasonably identify or associate the goods sold under
the mark with the geographic location contained in the mark."189
Through a gazetteer and an encyclopedia the examiner had
established that Venice was known for glass, lace, art objects, jewelry,
cotton and silk textiles, printing and publishing; thus, such products
satisfied the prima facie goods/place application test.90 The Board
rejected Save Venice's executive director's declaration that she "knew
from personal experience that none of the applicant's [categories of]
goods were manufactured or sold in Venice, Italy" as a self-serving
statement that "strain[ed] credulity."19' The Federal Circuit found
that this rejection was not an abuse of discretion.12
The court grouped each of Save Venice's products into two
categories: (1) products "identical to traditional Venetian products,
and (2) those related to such products."1 93 In the end, the court
found that the disputed mark was primarily geographically
misdescriptive and would likely confuse consumers with respect to
the source in connection with both the identical and the related
goods.
194
With respect to the goods "related to" traditional Venetian
products, the Board had borrowed a concept from a different area of
trademark law in its decision. The Board used the Federal Circuit's
"related goods" test, set forth in Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation's Foodservice,
Inc.195 and re-stated in Save Venice, which "measures whether a
reasonably prudent consumer would believe that non-competitive but
related goods sold under similar marks derive from the same source,
or are affiliated with, connected with, or sponsored by the same
trademark owner."' 96 The test is usually applied to refuse registration
when a mark so resembles a previously registered mark that the
public is likely to believe the applicant's goods come from the same
source or are somehow affiliated with the goods of the owner of the
previous mark.97
189. Id. at 1353-54, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1783.
190. Id. at 1354, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1783.
191. Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1783.
192. Save Venice, 259 F.3d at 1354, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1783.
193. Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1783.
194. Id. at 1355, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1784.
195. 710 F.2d 1565, 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 390 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
196. Save Venice, 259 F.3d at 1355, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1784 (citing Giant Food,
710 F.2d 1565, 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 390).
197. See Nina Ricci, S.A.R.L. v. E.T.F. Enters., 889 F.2d 1070, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1901 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (denying registration for a perfume, clothing, and accessories
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The Federal Circuit reviewed de novo this adaptation of the "related
goods" test to the area of geographic marks, an issue of first
impression. The court found that geographic regions that are known
for certain products could potentially expand on their traditional
products to fit "changing customer needs." 198 In addition, the court
found that the public does not necessarily assume that only a region's
traditional goods are associated with that region.19 Because the
public may intuit that geographic regions will expand the production
of goods and services beyond those traditionally from the region, andS 200
begin to produce related goods or services, the court expanded the
reach of the "related goods" doctrine, holding that "the registrability
of a geographic mark may be measured against the public's
association of that region with both its traditional goods and any
related goods or services that the public is likely to believe originate
there. ,0 '
D. Genericness
Generic terms are "common names that the purchasing public
understands primarily as describing the type of goods or services
being sold."20 2 They are "incapable of indicating a single source of
goods or services, and cannot be registered as trademarks.
'20 3
According to the Federal Circuit, to grant a generic mark registration
"would grant the owner of the mark a monopoly, since a competitor
could not describe his goods as what they are."20 4 In 2001, the Federal
Circuit decided two cases in which the Trademark Trial and Appeal
mark that was confusingly similar to a preexisting and well-known mark for women's
accessories); see generally 4 J. THoMAS McCARTHY, McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:63 (4th ed. 1997) ("[T]he confusion necessary for the
trademark infringement of federally registered marks is not limited purely to
confusion of purchasers as to the source of goods, but to any kind of confusion, such
as confusion between the products themselves.").
198. See Save Venice, 259 F.3d at 1355, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1784 ("In the
modem marketing context, geographic regions that are noted for certain products
or services actively promote and adapt their specialties to fit changing consumer
needs.").
199. Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1784.
200. Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1784.
201. Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1784.
202. In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., 240 F.3d 1341, 1344, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1807, 1810 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing In re Merrill Lynch, 828 F.2d 1567, 1569-
70, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1141, 1142 (Fed. Cir. 1987)); see also H. Marvin Ginn Corp.
v. Int'l Ass'n of Fire Chiefs, Inc., 782 F.2d 987, 989-90, 228 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 528,
530 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("[T]he critical issue in genericness cases is whether the
members of the relevant public primarily understand the term sought to be
protected to refer to the genus of goods or services in question.").
203. Dial-A-Mattress, 240 F.3d at 1344, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1810.
204. Menill Lynch, 828 F.2d at 1559, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142.
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Board concluded that the marks were generic, reversing one case and
affirming the Board's decision in the other.
1. 1-888-M-A-T-R-E-S-S: In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp.
At issue in In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., °5 was the Board's
prior holding that the mark was unregistrable because it was either a
generic or merely descriptive mark. In reversing the Board's
determination that a mark was generic, the Federal Circuit tackled
the distinction between a generic and a descriptive mark and clarified
the application of its two tests used to determine whether a term is
206generic.
Dial-A-Mattress sold mattresses and bedding through retail stores
and through its telephone service. 7 In 1996, it filed an application
to register 1-888-M-A-T-R-E-S-S for its "telephone shop-at-home retail
services in the field of mattresses. 2 8 It had previous registrations for
other marks, including DM DIAL A MATRES (and design), (212)
M-A-T-T-R-E-S, 1-800-MATTRES, AND LEAVE OFF THE LAST
S-THAT'S THE S FOR SAVINGS, and DIALA-MATTRESS.
2 9
Dial-A-Mattress claimed that 1-888-M-A-T-R-E-S-S was "inherently
distinctive or, alternatively, that it had acquired distinctiveness."210 In
addition to presenting its own prior registrations in support of its
application, Dial-A-Mattress presented its assistant general counsel's
declaration in which he stated that Dial-A-Mattress "sought to register
'1-800-MATRESS,' '1-888-MATRESS' and '1-888-MATTRES' to
further protect its existing marks and because it received an
'inordinate number' of customer calls on these lines,21' presumably
by people who either misdialed or did not know how to spell the
word "mattress."
As established in H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. International Ass'n of Fire
Chiefs, Inc.212 and its progeny, the Federal Circuit applied the two-part
inquiry used to determine whether a mark is generic: "First, what is
the genus of the goods or services at issue? Second, is the term
sought to be registered . . . understood by the relevant public
primarily to refer to that genus of goods or services? 213 Citing In re
205. 240 F.3d 1341, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1807 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
206. Id. at 1343, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1809.
207. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1809.
208. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1809.
209. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1809.
210. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1809.
211. Id. at 1343-44, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1809-10.
212. 782 F.2d 987, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 528 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
213. Id. at 990, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 530.
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Merrill Lynch, one of the primary Federal Circuit cases regarding
genericness, the court set forth a litany of sources that it considered
competent to show evidence of the public's perception of a
challenged term, including surveys, dictionary definitions, and
214
newspapers.
The Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") has the burden of
proving that a term is generic.21 5 The PTO can meet this burden by
satisfying one of two Federal Circuit tests. 216 Where a mark is a
"compound term formed by the union of words, 2 17 the PTO may
satisfy its burden by using the rule set forth in In re Gould Paper
Corp.,218 which requires evidence that (1) each of the separate words
constituting the mark is generic, and (2) that "the separate words
joined to form a compound have a meaning identical to the meaning
common usage would ascribe to those words as a compound., 219 The
In re Gould rule only applies if the public understands the individual
terms to be generic, and thejoining of the individual terms lends "no
additional meaning to the term."22° If the proposed mark is a phrase
and not simply a compound word, however, the Board "cannot
simply cite definitions and generic uses of the constituent terms of
[the] mark."22' Instead, under the rule set forth in H. Marvin Ginn
Corp. v. International Ass'n of Fire Chiefs, Inc.,222 and In re American
Fertility Society,tm it must conduct an inquiry into the "meaning of the
disputed phrase as a whole.' 'u4
According to the Federal Circuit, the Board applied the incorrect
rule. The Board applied In re Gould, asserting that 1-888-M-A-T-R-E-S-
214. Dial-A-Mattress, 240 F.3d at 1344, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1810 (citing In re
Merrill Lynch, 828 F.2d 1567, 1570, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1141, 1143 (Fed. Cir.
1987)).
215. Id. at 1810 (citing In reAm. Fertility Soc'y, 188 F.3d 1341, 1345, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1832, 1834 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
216. Compare Am. Fertility Soc'y, 188 F.3d 1341, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1832 (holding
that the PTO cannot meet its burden of proof solely by examining the genericness of
the phrase constituents), with In re Gould Paper Corp., 834 F.2d 1017, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1110 (Fed Cir. 1987) (finding the mark SCREENWIPE" to be generic
without any demonstrated use of the exact composite).
217. In re Goul4, 834 F.2d at 1019, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1112.
218. 834 F.2d 1017, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1110 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
219. Id. at 1018, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1111-12; see also Dial-A-Mattress, 240 F.3d at
1345, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1810 (identifying the word "Screenwipe" as an
example of a compound term that would be examined under the In re Gould test).
220. Am. Fertility Soc'y, 188 F.3d at 1348, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1834.
221. Id. at 1350, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1836.
222. 782 F.2d 987, 228 U.S.P.Q. 528, 530 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
223. 188 F.3d 1341, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1832 (Fed Cir. 1999).
224. Dial-A-Mattress, 240 F.3d at 1345, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1810 (quoting Am.
Fertility Soc'y, 188 F.3d at 1347, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1836).
7732002]
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
S was a compound term.22 5 The Board found that (1) the (888) area
code had no source indicating significance, (2) "matress" is the
equivalent of the word "mattress," and (3) mattress is a generic
term. 6 It contended that 'joining these two generic terms added no
additional meaning to the mark than the individual meanings of its
constituent parts."22 7  The Board presented no evidence for the
conclusion that the joined phrase held no additional meaning.2s
Instead, it relied on Dranoff-Perlstein Associates v. Sklar2 from the
Third Circuit, which ruled that trademark protection should not be
granted for telephone numbers composed of a general mnemonic
word.23°
Dial-A-Mattress did not dispute these findings or the Board's legal
conclusions under In re Gould. Instead, Dial-A-Mattress contended
that the mark was not a compound term and argued that the Board
should have applied Ginn and American Fertility Society, to determine
whether the mark "as a whole" is understood by the purchasing
public to "refer to the genus of goods and services." ' The court
agreed, finding that 1-888-M-A-T-R-E-S-S bore a closer resemblance to
a phrase than a compound word.232 In addition, the Federal Circuit
pointed out the subtlety that the In re Gould test was limited to cases
involving compound terms formed by the union of words, and not by
the union of "a series of numbers and a word. 2 3 While the court
agreed with the Board that "(888)" was "devoid of source-indicating
significance," it stated that the set of numbers itself was not a "generic
term for selling by telephone. 234 Then examining the record in light
of the Ginn and American Fertility Society rules, the court found a lack
of substantial evidence to support the conclusion that
1-888-M-A-T-R-E-S-S, taken as a whole, was a generic term.2 5
Analogizing to the phrase "Fire Chief' (used as a magazine title) in
Ginn, the court reasoned that there was no evidence that the relevant
225. See id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1810 (explaining that if each part of a
compound word is generic, the combination is also generic).
226. Id. at 1347, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1810.
227. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1810.
228. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1810.
229. 967 F.2d 852, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1174 (3d Cir. 1992).
230. See id. at 859, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1180 ("Because telephone numbers
contain only an area code and seven digits, the range of commonly used alternatives
which effectively communicate the same functional information ... is severely
limited in that context.").
231. Dial-A-Mattress, 240 F.3d at 1345,57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1810-11.
232. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1810-11.
233. Id. at 1346, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1811.
234. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1811.
235. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1811.
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public referred to telephone mattress retailers as
"l-888-M-A-T-R-E-S-S."2" Further analogizing to the phrase "cash
management account" in In re Merrill Lynch,27 the court found that
1-888-M-A-T-R-E-S-S did not "immediately and unequivocally describe
the service at issue." m
The Board made an alternative determination that even if the
mark was not generic, it was merely descriptive of the services and not
registrable because Dial-A-Mattress had not made a sufficient showing
of acquired distinctiveness.2 9 Dial-A-Mattress argued that the mark
was not descriptive, but the Federal Circuit rejected that assertion
outright, contending that the mark clearly conveyed the impression
that "a service relating to mattresses is available by telephone."240
Thus, to determine registrability, the question then became
whether the mark had achieved secondary meaning; whether "'in the
minds of the public, the primary significance of a product feature or
term is to identify the source of the product rather than the product
itself.' '24' Here, the unusual aspect of determining secondary
meaning or acquired distinctiveness was that Dial-A-Mattress was not
yet using the mark; rather it had simply filed an intent to use
application .2 2 To make its case, Dial-A-Mattress would have had to
establish that 1-888-M-A-T-R-E-S-S was the legal equivalent of one of
its prior marks.243
The Board contended that the mark "(212) M-A-T-T-R-E-S" was not
the legal equivalent of "1-888-M-A-T-R-E-S-S" because the (212)
portion "was subject to change and should not be given much
weight."244 Yet again, the Board was incorrect in the eyes of the
Federal Circuit. The court rejected this contention, finding that even
though the (212) was subject to change at the whim of the phone
company, the marks were still mnemonically similar and legal
equivalents .2  Thus, the court allowed Dial-A-Mattress to rely on
236. Id. at 1345, 57 U.S.P.Q. at 1810-11.
237. 828 F.2d 1567, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1141 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
238. Dial-A-Mattress, 240 F.3d at 1345, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1810-11.
239. Id. at 1346-47, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1811-12.
240. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1811-12.
241. Id. at 1347, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1812 (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives
Labs., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.1l (1982)).
242. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1812.
243. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1812 (noting that marks are legal equivalents
when they create "the same, continuing commercial impression such that the
consumer would consider them both the same mark").
244. Dial-A-Mattress, 240 F.3d at 1347-48, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1812-13. When
Dial-A-Mattress registered the (212) M-A-T-T-R-E-S mark, it placed broken lines
around the (212) portion, indicating that the area code was subject to change. Id. at
1343, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1809.
245. Id. at 1347-48, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1812-13.
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(212) M-A-T-T-R-E-S as prima facie evidence of acquired
distinctiveness. Additionally, the Federal Circuit agreed that, because
of the similarity of the services detailed for the marks, the relatively
slight difference in spelling of the mnemonics, and the public's
propensity for misspelling, people associated "1-888-M-A-T-R-E-S-S"
with Dial-A-Mattress and "at least some consumers" were attempting
to reach Dial-A-Mattress when they used it.
246
2. Birthday balloons: In re Watts
The other case addressing the issue of a generic term was short and
sweet-and rightfully so. In an unpublished opinion, In re Watts,
the Federal Circuit accepted the decision of the Board affirming an
examiner's refusal to register the term "BIRTHDAY BALLOONS."
248
The court found sufficient factual evidence to support the Board and
examiner's findings that the mark was generic and thus ineligible for
registration.249 In fact, the court did not even see the need to set
forth the Ginn standard used in Dial-A-Mattress, and instead relied on
evidence that the examiner conducted a search of the Lexis-Nexis
database and found 664 stories referring to the term "birthday
balloons.''nz o In addition, the examiner submitted evidence of third
party registrations where the registrant had used the term "birthday
balloons" to describe its goods.2' Thus, the examiner concluded, and
the Board agreed, that the public would understand the term
"birthday balloons" to refer to balloons given on birthdays .
2
The applicant, Watts, who wanted to use the term for mail order
gift balloon services, argued that "when purchasing such balloons,
one would ask for 'balloons for a birthday,' rather than 'birthday
balloons,"' and maintained that the mark was "unique, creative,
descriptive, [and] distinctive. '5 3 Watts further presented evidence of
his own Lexis-Nexis report which purportedly showed that the mark
had been used only five or six times in that database in 1999 in major
U.S. newspapers. z4 The court found this argument unpersuasive, and
instead held that even these five or six instances (without the
hundreds of others found by the examiner) would have constituted
246. Id. at 1348, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1813.
247. In reWatts, No. 75-529, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 9332 (Fed. Cir. May 16, 2001).
248. Id. at *1.
249. Id. at *3.
250. Id. at *2.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. In reWatts, No.75-529, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 9332 (Fed. Cir. May 16, 2001).
254. Id.
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sufficient evidence to uphold the Board's decision., 5
CONCLUSION
Although 2001 was a quiet year for Federal Circuit trademark
jurisprudence, the court did send a clear message that the Board and
district judges must follow proper procedure. The Federal Circuit
thus fulfilled its statutory mission to give uniformity and oversight in
trademark cases, and also met its constitutional duty of ensuring due
process for litigants. Fulfillment of these duties is particularly
important in its review of the Trademark Trial and Review Board, as
the Board is not an Article III tribunal with the protections of
presidential nomination, senatorial consent and life appointment of
its administrative law judges.
Thus, in 2001, trademark practitioners and the interested public
can feel secure that the Federal Circuit has done itsjob in fulfilling its
appointed oversight role.
255. Id. at *3.
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